This paper explores the extent and character of interest group influence on legislative policy in a model of decision making under incomplete information. A committee may propose an alternative to a given status quo under closed rule. Policies are related to consequences with ex ante uncertainty. An interest group is able to acquire policy-relevant information at a price, and has access to legislators at both the agenda setting stage and the vote stage. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission. The price of information is itself a private datum to the group, and legislators cannot observe whether the group elects to become informed. If the group is informed, then its information is likewise private. Among the results are: that not all informed lobbyists choose to try and influence the agenda directly; that there can coexist influential lobbying at both stages of the process; and that while informative agenda stage lobbying is generically influential, the same is not true of voting stage lobbying.
Introduction
Interest groups are typically seen to influence policy in two ways: through the giving of campaign contributions and through the distribution of specialist information. Although logically distinct, these two activities are surely related empirically. The basic premise of the "access" view of campaign contributions, in particular, is that groups make contributions to secure the attention of the relevant legislator. Despite such interrelationships, this paper is concerned exclusively with the role of groups as sources of policy-relevant information. In this context, lobbying is strategic information transmission.
Policy is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Legislators care about policy only in so far as they care about its consequences. Such consequences may be purely "political" (eg. How are reelection chances affected?), or they may be technical (eg. How will a revised Clean Air Act hurt employment in the car industry?). If there is no uncertainty about how policies map into consequences, then there is no issue here. However, such omniscience is rare and decision makers are frequently choosing policies without complete information on their consequences. In which case, information becomes valuable and those that possess it are accordingly in a position to influence policy.
In an important series of papers, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987 , 1989 ) study a legislative decision making process in which a committee is informed about the consequences of policy decisions relative to the majority of the House. Their focus is on the House's selection of rules for consideration of committee proposals to change the status quo; especially: When will a majoritarian House agree to a closed rule that surrenders monopoly agenda setting power to a minority committee? Loosely speaking, the answer is when the expected informational gains under a dosed rule outweigh the expected distributional losses from that rule. In effect, the distributional loss is a price paid by the House in exchange for the committee revealing more information about the consequences of policy. For many decisions, however, the degree of informational asymmetry between committee members and the legislative body as a whole is negligible. Instead, it is interest groups who possess the relevant information (Rothenberg, 1989; Hansen, 1991) . Unlike legislators, interest groups or lobbyists have no legislative decision making rights. But nevertheless they can, as observed above, influence policy through the specialist information they offer legislators.
In what follows, I build on the basic Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) model by, inter alia, introducing a lobbyist in addition to the committee and the House.
Legislative decision making is by closed rule and only the lobbyist may (but does not necessarily) possess technical information about the consequences of selecting any given policy. All the agents -legislators and lobbyist -have preferences over consequences that, with their beliefs about the relationship between policies and consequences, induce preferences over policies per se. Because preferences over consequences are primitive, "influence" only occurs through changing beliefs. And the extent to which any information offered to alter beliefs is effective, depends on the credibility of the lobbyist to the legislator in question. Such credibility is endogenous to the model, and depends partly upon how closely the lobbyist's preferences over consequences reflect those of the legislator being lobbied, and on how confident is the legislator that the lobbyist is in fact informed.
An important issue here concerns identifying the circumstances under which a lobbyist chooses to lobby the committee at the agenda setting stage, or to lobby the House at the subsequent voting stage, or both. Clearly, the character of the information that might be transmitted and the nature of the influence that might be exerted, is likely to differ between these stages. Among the results presented below are, first, that there exist circumstances under which influential lobbying can take place at both stages of the process, but that the structure of the information offered at each stage is distinct; second, that agenda stage lobbying can be influential even when the House's most preferred policy consequence lies between those of the committee and the lobbyist; and third, that more information can be offered here, where it is occasionally uncertain whether the lobbyist is informed or not, than is possible in the Gilligan/Krehbiel environment where the committee is known to possess information surely.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model and section 3 reviews two benchmark cases against which to juxtapose the results presented in section 4. Section 5 contains some numerical examples to illustrate the results; and section 6 is a brief conclusion. All formal proofs are confined to an appendix.
Model

Agents and decision sequence.
There is an exogenously given status quo policy, s e IR. Changes from the status quo are governed by a dosed rule whereby a committee has the sole legislative right to propose an alternative policy, following which the legislature as a whole votes on whether to accept the committee's proposal or to retain the status quo. Assume that the committee is a unitary actor, C, and that there is a pivotal voter in the legislature as a whole (the House), H. Both C and H have primitive preferences over the consequences of policy decisions which, ex ante, are known only with uncertainty. In addition to C and H, there is a third interested party, a lobbyist L. L has no legislative decision making rights, but has access to both the committee and the House. Moreover, relative to both C and H, L might be better informed about the consequences of legislation. Consequently, lobbying in this model is strategic information transmission, in which L seeks to persuade C or H to behave in certain ways by providing information about the consequences of their legislative decisions (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992) . The sequence of events and decisions detailed below is summarized in Figure 1 . [FIGURE 1 HERE] Three central aspects of the model are, first, that only the lobbyist L has the opportunity to acquire information about how policies map into consequences; second, that if L does acquire such information, it is private information to L; and third, whether or not L has acquired information is itself private information to L. However, with respect to this last point, I assume on the one hand that if L chooses to lobby some legislative actor j E {C,H}, then j can costlessly verify whether L has acquired the information (but not what that information is); but, on the other hand, L has no way of credibly demonstrating that L has not acquired data. For example, given that information acquisition is costly, L can prove to j that L has acquired data by submitting the appropriate accounts. But while documentation can establish some fact or other, the absence of documentation does not prove the case either way.'
To model the features listed above, at the start of the game Nature is assumed to pick a price at which the lobbyist is able to purchase information. Let p E [0, 1] denote this price, and assume p N U[0,1] with this distribution being common knowledge among {C,H,L}. Once Nature has selected p randomly from the uniform distribution on [0,1], p is revealed privately to L who then chooses whether or not to acquire information. The technology governing how policies map into consequences is assumed to be,
where y E ER is a consequence, b E fit is a policy decision, and t N U[0,1] is an ex 'See Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Suzumura (1990) for a discussion of the difficulty of showing that one does not know something. A less prosaic reference can be found in Hollywood: it was exactly this difficulty that lead to Dustin Hofman being given such an unpleasant dental exam by Sir Laurence Olivier in the film, Marathon Man.
ante unknown parameter uncorrelated with p (cf. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) In the model, lobbying itself is modeled as a cheap-talk speech (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Farrell, 1988; Austen-Smith, 1990 : it is no more difficult for a lobbyist to tell the truth about the value of t than it is for him or her to dissemble.
Although, by assumption, legislators can verify whether or not L does possess information on t, they cannot determine the value of t independently of any information L gives them. And since L is known to have preferences over consequences, legislators will take account of the strategic incentives for lobbyists to dissemble. After hearing what the lobbyist has to say, if anything, the committee then chooses an alternative proposal to the status quo.
Once the alternative is fixed, L may choose to acquire information at the price p if he or she has not already done so. Having made this decision (again, private information to L), L may lobby H or not at all (evidently, given the agenda is set at this stage, there is no further incentive for L to lobby C). Again, L's lobbying is strategic information transmission and modeled as a cheap-talk speech. Finally, the House votes on whether to accept the committee's proposal or to retain the status quo; and the game ends with all agents receiving their payoffs from the House's 2It is worth noting that the assumption that L learns the true value of t is considerably stronger than necessary. Making the assumption facilitates the exposition. 3Assuming that L cannot lobby H, or both C and H together, at this stage, is substantively restrictive (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989) and will be discussed further in the concluding section. Formally relaxing the assumption is deferred to subsequent work. policy decision.
2.2 Preferences. Each agent j E {C,H,L} has preferences over consequences given by, (2) Hi(y) = -(xj -y)2 ; y E at, xi E R.
These preferences are common knowledge and it assumed that xC x11 E 0. No restriction is placed on the relative location of L's ideal point at this stage.
Given (1) and (2), j's induced preferences over policies are given by,
where the expectations are conditional on all the information that j possesses. It follows immediately from (3) that, for all j, the higher is the realized value of t, the larger is j's most preferred policy. In particular, for informed lobbyists, L's most preferred policy decision is strictly increasing in L's type t. Crawford and Sobel (1982, Theorem 1) , who demonstrate that all equilibria in a game of this form are essentially "partition" equilibria: the set T is partitioned into intervals and all types in a given interval use the same signaling strategy. Allowing for mixed strategies, therefore, simply means that there need be no out-of-equilibrium beliefs to specify. And in the present context, the issue is purely technical. Hence, C's proposal strategy is a map: 
Equilibrium concept.
The basic notion is sequential equilibrium: loosely speaking, at every decision node (both reached and unreached) every agent chooses a strategy that maximizes that agent's expected payoffs, and expectations are derived from players' strategies and the priors using Bayes Rule where this is defined. In the present context, there are multiple sequential equilibria, due largely to lobbying strategies being cheap-talk. Some of these equilibria are essentially identical in that they differ only in a labeling convention, and I shall ignore such differences. More important is that there invariably exists an equilibrium in which the lobbyist never acquires information -even at zero cost -and no lobbying takes place. Such an equilibrium is supported by pooling lobbying strategies conditional on L acquiring information (Farrell, 1988) . With a pooling strategy, all lobbyist types (i.e. whatever the value of t that L learns is the truth) send the same message and, therefore, the listener can infer nothing. Hence the message is wholly uninformative; in which case there is no incentive for the lobbyist to purchase information in the first place. This kind of uninformative equilibrium specifies the least amount of information and influence that might be observed. Of more interest is the opposite extreme.
Consequently, in what follows I shall only consider the most informative available equilibria. There are two justifications for this selection. The first, as already observed, is that it is useful to identify how much information transmission and influence there can be in any given institution; and the second is that, in the present context of risk-averse agents and uniform priors, all agents ex ante strictly prefer that the most informative equilibrium is played rather than any other (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; .
Definition: An equilibrium is a list of strategies ? E (( 51`,A1,6:,Av *), r*, LA) and a set of beliefs it s (pc ,p,H) such that:
(e5) 15:+a; = 0 Av * s $; Sl at + 6"; > 0 Vt E T,
(e7) pc and pa are derived from the priors and cr* by Bayes Rule where defined.
Where there is no ambiguity I shall refer to an "equilibrium a*", taking the specification of beliefs as understood.
It is important to note that the definition implies, in equilibrium, that the price at which L will choose to acquire information is endogenous. This follows influential.
An action is said to be elicited by a lobbying strategy if there is a message sent under the strategy that induces the listener to take that action. Clearly, the maximum number of actions (votes) that a voting stage lobbying strategy, A v, might elicit is two, and the maximum number of actions (proposals) that an agenda stage lobbying strategy, A a' might elicit is infinite. Suppose there exist two distinct equilibria a and a' such that (A a,Av) are used in a and (A a ',Av) are used in a'.
Then A a (resp. A 1.) is at least as influential as A' (resp. A;) iff at least as many a actions are elicited by A a (resp. Av) as by Aa ' (resp. Av).
Definition: An equilibrium e is most influential iff the agenda stage lobbying strategy, Aa, used in the equilibrium is at least as influential as the agenda stage lobbying strategy used in any other available equilibrium, and, given A:, the voting stage lobbying strategy, A*, is at least as influential as the voting stage lobbying strategy used in any other available equilibrium in which A: used.
In what follows, the focus is on most influential equilibria. Given the lexicographic structure of the definition, such equilibria always exist. (A justification for defining " most influential" in this way is given below.)
Two Benchmarks
Before proceeding to results from the model, it is useful to identify two benchmark cases in which the lobbyist plays no role. In the first, there is full information: in particular, both C and H know the true value of t. And in the second, the committee is fully informed but the House and lobbyist are uninformed.
The former case has been much studied in the Structure Induced Equilibria literature (eg. Denzau and MacKay, 1983) , and the latter case is analyzed in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) . Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium proposals and outcomes for the full information case. In equilibrium, the committee proposes its most favoured alternative from the set of policies that both C and H prefer to the status quo.
When this set is empty, C may propose any policy that it prefers to s, knowing it will be rejected; in Figure 2 , it is assumed that in such cases C simply proposes the status quo.
[
FIGURE 2 HERE]
If no agent is informed, then the equilibrium policy proposal and expected outcome for any s can be read off from Figure 2 by setting t equal to its expected value.
The situation is more complicated for the asymmetric information case. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) demonstrate that the most influential equilibrium (suitably defined for this case) is of the form illustrated in Figure 3 .
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
For small and large values of t, the committee's equilibrium proposal reveals all the information and C is able to extract all of its monopoly agenda setting rents as in the full information case. For intermediate values of t, however, this is not so. In particular, the committee is unable credibly to offer any proposal for t E (s,s+xC) that can defeat the status quo. In the full information case there is such a proposal for every t in this range, and all of these proposals have an equilibrium outcome equal to t-s.
Results
In what follows, let o-* denote an arbitrary equilibrium. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, equilibrium statements refer to most influential equilibria. Formal proofs for results are contained in the Appendix.
The first two results, although of some substantive interest, serve principally to simplify finding equilibria.
The lemma is essentially technical and says that H will never randomize in equilibrium. In particular, if there is no influential lobbying at the voting stage then H will choose the committee's proposal whenever H is indifferent between the proposal and the status quo. A formal proof for the Lemma is omitted: Lemma 1.1 follows from sequential equilibria being subgame perfect (Banks and Gasmi, 1987) ; Lemma 1.2 follows easily from Lemma 1.1 and the definition of most influential.
Lemma 2: 6*(.) = 0 is always a best response.
To all intents and purposes therefore, if ever L chooses to become informed then L does so at the agenda setting stage of the game. Specifically, if 6 1 ;(.) = 1 is a best response then there exists no equilibrium in which A a(•) is influential. Hence, f5* (•) = 1 is also a best response because waiting until the voting stage has no a strategic or payoff-relevant implications for L, C or H. So without loss of generality, set 5(.) = 0 and write S s 5a hereafter.
The next result is substantive, providing a simple result characterization of the circumstances under which L can influence H's vote once the agenda has been set.
Let L(t') denote an informed lobbyist who has observed that the true value of t is t'.
(Later, the equilibrium set T( . ) will be characterized.) Thus, voting stage lobbying can influence the House's decision if and only if, first, the committee's proposal and the lobbyist's preferences jointly induce a division of types into "high" and "low"
and, second, the midpoint between the committee's proposal and the status quo lies between the (conditional) expected "high" type and the expected "low" type. In turn, the result suggests that, from a strategic perspective, only two speeches will be given in vote stage lobbying. This suggestion is discussed momentarily; before doing so, it is convenient to consider how the committee responds to any agenda stage lobbying.
Not surprisingly, the committee's equilibrium behavior reflects the equilibrium strategy identified by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) , illustrated in Figure 3 . In particular, in a most influential equilibrium, as the ideal point xi, of an informed lobbyist converges to that of the committee, xc, the committee's proposal strategy converges to the Gilligan/Krehbiel committee strategy. In general, however, the lobbyist and the committee will have distinct preferences over consequences and so the number of proposals that can be elicited in equilibrium is finite. A partial characterization of the strategy is given the appendix. For now however, it suffices to report two facts. First, the committee will report a proposal that (ceteris paribus) induces the House to choose the status quo s, say b = s, only if the committee believes the expected value of t to lie within the interval (s-xc,s1. 6 And second, unlike in the benchmark case where C has full information, there can exist at most one proposal in the interval (s,s+2xc). This is due to the finite number of proposals that any agenda stage lobbying can elicit when it is L who is informed and
x L x C ; the relevant incentive compatibility constraints are less demanding.
With Proposition 1, the partial characterization of the committee's proposal strategy yields the following claim. Proposition 2.1 follows from the committee being able to offer any proposal on°S trictly speaking, C here can choose any policy that induces H to vote for s in the absence of any voting stage lobbying by L. To avoid irrelevant generalities (and having to make repeated qualifications during the exposition), it is assumed that C simply reports s.
Tormally: Vt E T•, A*(t,• ) E Z C Zll ; Vt' f t( .), A*(t ',•) E ZH\i. the real line as an alternative to the status quo. Because of this, any informative lobbying by the interest group will lead the committee to update its beliefs about the true value of t and adjust its proposal accordingly. Unless all the information that could possibly be offered leads the committee to update its beliefs to expecting the true value of t to lie within (s-x e ,․), then the proposal offered will be sensitive to the lobbyist's speech. In contrast, once the agenda is set, the House can do only one of two things: accept or reject the proposal. Consequently, all vote stage lobbying amounts to a speech either supporting the proposal or supporting the status quo; Proposition 2.2 then follows. So if all informed lobbyist types actively lobby the committee, then it must be the case that some of these types elicit precisely the same proposal from the committee as the committee would choose if it were not lobbied at all. This necessary condition identified in Proposition 3 is extremely restrictive; in particular, if xc it cannot be expected to hold. Consequently, the result implies that in virtually any influential equilibrium, at least some informed types will not lobby the committee. Given this, what C chooses to do when A a(•) is influential and C is not lobbied depends on C's beliefs, first, about the likelihood that L is informed and, second, about which informed types prefer not to lobby at the agenda setting stage.
Proposition 4 gives some qualitative information on the second issue. 
LIxxcHO
That T° is an interval follows from Crawford and Sobel (1982) , who prove that all informative (equilibrium) lobbying strategies Aa (•) must have a partition structure in which all types in a partition send the same message. Beyond this, the proposition says that, unless the committee's and the lobbyist's preferences coincide, in a most influential equilibrium it is the relatively "low" ["high"] types who choose not to lobby when xi, > [<] xc . The result is fairly intuitive, although it should be emphasized that for some parameterizations there can exist equilibria in which, for example, "high" types do not lobby when x i, > xc; but such equilibria cannot be the most influential, given L and C have different preferences. Furthermore, as L's preferences become more similar to C's, the set of types choosing not to lobby shrinks, becomes more centrist, and coincides in the limit with the type (t = 1/2) whose most preferred committee proposal is exactly what the committee would choose on the basis of the prior information only. The intuition here is simply that C's and L's preferences are identical in the limit, so L(1/2) "staying home" gives C exactly the same information as if L(1/2) lobbied actively.
An immediate implication of Proposition 4 and the committee's best response
proposal strategy is that the committee's proposal consequent on not being lobbied is, ceteris paribus, typically biased away from the proposal it would offer if there were no lobbyist at all. Formally, Because x > x = 0 by assumption, it follows from Propositions 1 and 5.1 that for -some given distances between x i, and xc , a lobbyist having xL > xc can, ceteris paribus, be influential only at the agenda setting stage whereas a lobbyist having xL < x can be influential at both the agenda setting and at the vote stage.
Assuming it to be common knowledge that L has information, and assuming further that C is free to implement any policy it chooses (in effect, that H prefers the consequence xc to the consequence s-t for all t E T), Crawford and Sobel (1982) prove that, with quadratic utilities and a uniform prior on T, there can exist an influential equilibrium lobbying strategy Aa ( • ) if and only if I xL -xc < 1/4 (see also Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987) . With respect to Proposition 6.3(h), it is important to emphasize that the result is only true for equilibria that are most influential; there may exist equilibria in which some given L(t) actively lobbies and has influence both at the agenda setting stage and at the vote stage, but such equilibria are not most influential.
Empirically, of course, lobbyists are observed to lobby both at the agenda setting stage and at the voting stage. Insofar as they are ineffective at one of these stages, such data is consistent with the model here. However, on some occasions lobbyist are influential at both stages. Ceteris paribus, the result above implies that this can only occur if there is some additional uncertainty present; for instance, concerning the house's ideal point. And this is intuitive.
In the discussion following Proposition 2, it was observed that only those L(t) prefering s to 7r*, t(7r*, ․ ), have an incentive actively to lobby H at the voting stage (given any arbitrarily small cost of gaining access). Proposition 6 asserts that if such lobbying is influential, then the set tir*, ․) invariably comprises those informed types who do not actively lobby the committee; i.e. t(7r*, ․) = T°(s).
Examples
This section presents some simple examples to illustrate the sorts of equilibrium phenomena identified above. In all of the examples with influential agenda stage lobbying strategies, I xcxc I admits more informative equilibria than is possible under the assumption that L is known to be informed. Examples 1 and 2 illustrate equilibria with influential agenda stage lobbying and no vote stage lobbying. In This paper is concerned with the extent to which interest group lobbying, modeled exclusively as information transmission, can be informative or influential at agenda setting and voting stages of legislative decision making. Among the results are that informed lobbyists who choose not to lobby at the agenda stage are those whose information is "low" ["high"] when L's ideal point in consequences is higher [lower] than that of the House; that there can coexist influential lobbying at both stages of the process; that while informative agenda stage lobbying is generically influential, the same is not true of voting stage lobbying; that not all lobbyists will choose to become informed; and that uncertainty about whether a lobbyist has information or not can induce more information transmission than when there is no such uncertainty.
In the real world, there are many interest groups, legislators and sources of uncertainty. The model here is parsimonious in the extreme in these respects, and as such the results must be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, they are suggestive.
In particular, while it is intuitive that legislators' information about whether a group is informed or not should affect the ability of a lobbyist to influence decision making, it is surprising that such uncertainty leads to more influential behaviour at the agenda setting stage rather than less.
Among the assumptions it is desireable to relax is the assumption that the lobbyist may only lobby the committee, if anyone, at the agenda setting stage. If the lobbyist chose to lobby only the House at the agenda setting stage, the committee would make some inference about what information the lobbyist offered the House; and it may well be in the lobbyist's interests to induce such an inference.
Similar issues arise if the group lobbies both the committee and the House at the agenda setting stage. Since it is known that "who lobbies who" is important for legislators' decisions (Kingdon 1973) , there is good empirical reason to extend the model in this way. However, I conjecture that without multiple sources of uncertainty, little would change with the qualitative results given here. Another assumption that should be relaxed is that only the lobbyist has information.
Without this assumption, it will be possible to observe richer patterns of lobbying throughout the decision making process. All this is left for future work.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Let Tr be the proposal C offers if C is not lobbied by L. Since C cannot verify that L is not informed, 1r° will be offered irrespective of L's data acquisition decision. Since this is a pure strategy decision, e (in equilibrium) is fully anticipated by L. Therefore, because L is free to choose not to lobby C at the agenda stage and because the price of information is invariant between stages, L can never be made worse off by choosing to acquire information at the start of the process rather than after the agenda is set.o Proof: Fix A a(•) and let £(m l ) < i(m2) < < f(mN). Then in equilibrium, (e3) requires the following incentive compatibility conditions to hold:
(a2) and (3) easily yield, (a3) 'Imps) < r*(mi+i ,․) Vi = 1,...,N-1.
And, using (3), the inequalities (a2) hold iff, (a4) i(mi ) < [e(mi,․)+7*(mi+1, ․)]/2 -xc , Vi = 1,...,N-1.
Finally, note that (e7) implies, in equilibrium, that H knows C's information is characterized by some E {i(mi ) I i =1,...,N}. But this means s+xC < t(m2): contradiction. 
where p is the equilibrium price above which L chooses not to acquire information (that this is well defined is proved below). Suppose s is irrelevant, i.e. s $ (-xc,l+xc), fix xc, and let A E xi-xc > 0 (a symmetric argument applies for A < 0 and is omitted). By (a14) and (a15) with t = 0 and t N e 1. Two facts follow directly from this system: first, the most 0 -influential equilibrium partition (i.e. the maximal partition) is unique for any A; and second, for any xi , xi(xL > xL > xe) for which the maximal partition sizes are N and N+1, respectively, there exists a continuous deformation of the (maximal) partition at x i into the (maximal) partition at xi, preserving (*) throughout as xi xi (in particular, at the switching value x E ti in the partition at x is zero and 1 i m. t i = ti; etc.). Therefore, T° likewise changes continuously with xi. xi -4 x So given the result holds when the maximal partition size is two, if the Proposition fails in general there must exist some xi = lc, say, and hence A, such that, at A, Substituting into (a12) and (a13) and rearranging yields,
Then a E (1/4,1/2) implies:
Moreover, implicitly differentiating (a14) and collecting terms yields, dV/dp -(1-t°)t°/[(1-p+pt°)(3(1-p)+pt°) + (p(1-p+pt°2)] < 0.
Finally, p(0) = p(1) = 0; and Vt° E (0,1), 0 < p(t°) < 1.
Therefore, VA E (1/4, 1/2), 3(p(t°),t°(p)) E (0,1) x (0,1) solving (a14) and (a15). 
Mutatis mutandis, a
